

# Herbert Marcuse: Seminar on Hegel's *Science of Logic*

Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego  
Fall 1966 & Winter 1967 Terms

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February 2017

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*Disclaimer: These notes should not be interpreted as a verbatim record of what was said in this class by Professor Herbert Marcuse. Rather, they are my own interpretation and personal record of what was stated by both Marcuse and some the students in that seminar, without distinction. (WL)*

## *Introductory Note:*

This graduate seminar in the Department of Philosophy, held during 1966-1967 once each week in the evening between 8 and 11 pm, lasted 20 weeks in all. The only assigned text was Volume 1, Book Two, "The Doctrine of Essence" (*Die Lehre vom Wesen*), from Hegel's *Science of Logic*. No secondary sources were listed or assigned and no special attention was paid to the instructor's own writings on the subject. The professor's initial directive to the class was: "Open the text, read the first sentence, and tell me what you think it means in your own words."

During each three-hour session, the class covered on average five pages of the text; after twenty weeks, a total of one hundred pages had been discussed. One student - as I recall, it was Lowell Bergman - was bold enough to opine that the pace through the text seemed to be "a little slow," to which the professor replied that in his own postgraduate education he had once attended an entire six-month seminar which covered only the first page of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Another student suggested that the class might have dealt with Marx instead of Hegel and was told that understanding Marx was "too easy" for such a talented group.

Most of the attendees had come to the evening seminar from a day spent on the free-speech plaza at the La Jolla campus, and elsewhere in San Diego County, agitating against the Vietnam War. But when the door to the classroom was closed and the seminar began, the outside world seemed to vanish.

What follows is a collection of class notes and reading notes, photocopied from a set of unpaginated, loose, handwritten pages. They are not necessarily in the correct order, that is, they may not match exactly with the sequence of sections in Hegel's text.

The Index below is from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, translated and edited by George di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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## *Course Notes*

### Introduction to Hegel's "Lehre vom Wesen"

It is important to realize what Hegel is attempting here. He will try to show that in the development of Sein, Sein necessarily constitutes itself as Wesen: concretely, that actuality is only possible if first Wesen has provided the basis for its development.

Compared with, e.g., Plato: The Ideas are eternal, therefore their origin is inexplicable; moreover, how they can give rise to "motion" (development of actuality) is not clear -- this was Aristotle's complaint. Aristotle also, although pre-eminently, was concerned with the explanation of motion (development), cannot explain the origin of the forms or structures which shape the prime matter.

Hegel takes up this problem. For him actuality is impossible without the development of Sein as Wesen. If Wesen is simply the structure of thought, imposing its patterns upon an heterogeneous mass, then the opposition of subject and object is complete and final; but Hegel tries to show that Sein constitutes itself as Wesen. The existence of the determinate thing, as opposed to the determinate something, will require a "unifying force" to hold together its various states: this is Wesen. If Hegel can really show that Being "internalizes itself" in becoming Essence, then he will have proved that objective being is subjective being.

#### A. TRANSITION TO ESSENCE

Being is "abstract equivalence." Quality and Quantity have "disappeared," or rather qualitative quantity (measure) appears only as pure contentless determination, i.e., "empty difference" (yet obviously a "result," not the same as the original Being), "concrete" in that being has mediated itself through the negation of all determinations (negation of negation). The "Ansich" of Indifference, this "empty difference," is not self-determining, but only external being-determined and becoming-determined (I, 396-7; IV, 469).

As Indifference, the Absolute has these deficiencies: (1) the determinations are not determined through themselves; (2) the positing of these determinations is something immediate, not the mediation of the Absolute with itself. "Indifference is the last determination of Being before it becomes Essence": a negative totality produced by the contradiction between itself, as that which is completely Ansich, and its determination (posited determinateness)—being determined as indifferent, is has differentiation only as external to itself. (I, 403).

The totality of determinations of Dasein are self-cancelling, a universal contradiction: It is "Fürsichseiende" just because of this. There is once more unity in Being, rather than universal difference, but a "negative absolute unity" (negation of negation) (I, 398; IV, 471). This is Essence. Thru the annulling of the difference between quantity and quality, the unity of the two, which contains being and all its determinateness, is simple relation-to-self.

"The process of measure, instead of being only the wrong infinite of an endless progression, in shape of an ever-recurrent recoil from quality to quantity, and from quantity to quality, is also the true infinity of coincidence with self in another." (Wallace, p. 205). "In the sphere of Being, when somewhat becomes another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one to its other." (206)

In the "Lehre vom Sein" the constitution of an Etwas was seen to involve the incessant passing over to an Other, an infinite out-going. Now in the "Lehre vom Wesen" the movement remains within itself, does not go over to another; the process (mediation, reflection) is infinite relation to self, infinite return to self within self. This is the "Sich-Selbst-Gleichheit" of Reflection.

### *Introduction.*

1) Logic differs from all other sciences in that unlike them, it cannot begin with concepts where meanings are postulated "a priori"; in fact, the very concept of knowledge itself must be investigated thoroughly by logic.

Logic: "die Wissenschaft des Denkens im Allgemeinen" (37) – the usual view, whereas Form is abstracted from all content and then from all Truth (since Content is the "Essence of Truth").

2) Hegel identifies the usual concept of logic with the Kantian situation: there is a world, finished in itself, lying apart, which is approached by Thought (applied as Form to Matter) and receives a content without, however, this relationship modifying either in any essential way.

3) Older metaphysics (e.g. Spinoza and Leibniz) - only what is known of things through thought is true; thus the determination of thought and the nature of things agree.

4) Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* arrived at "der Begriff der Wissenschaft." It was shown that "Die reine Wissenschaft setzt somit die Befreiung von dem Gegensatz des Bewusstseins voraus. Sie enthält den Gedanken, insofern er ebenso die Sache an sich selbst ist, oder die Sache an sich selbst, insofern sie ebenso der reine Gedanke ist. Als Wissenschaft ist die Wahrheit das reine sich entwickelnde Selbstbewußtsein und hat die Gestalt des Selbsts, daß das an und für sich Seiende gewußter Begriff, der Begriff als solcher aber das an und für sich Seiende ist." (45)

5) "Die Platonische Idee ist nichts anderes als das Allgemeine oder bestimmter der Begriff des Gegenstandes; nur in seinem Begriffe hat etwas Wirklichkeit." (46)

6) "Method of logic": "consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of its contents" (51) [see no. 8]

7) Negation = determinate negation (51) – i.e., it has a content.

8) Method of logic is the "condition" of the contents of logic – i.e., dialectic (52).

9) Dialectic looked upon the ordinary logic as one tool among many, chiefly useful only (in a negative fashion) in upsetting established positions. Kant's great service, however, was to show "Der Objektivität des Scheins und Notwendigkeit des Widerspruchs" as belonging to the very nature of thought; moreover, one can extend this very easily to the positive side, by seeing "die innere Negativität desselben, als ihre sich selbst bewegende Seele, das Prinzip aller natürlichen und geistigen Lebendigkeit überhaupt." (54)

Spectulative knowledge consists in seeing contradiction in their unity, the positive in the negative.

10) Logic cannot work with concepts which have prior determinations (such as even mathematics does) but must show the concept determining itself.

11) Two "moments" of logic: (1) concept as divided into a subjective (für-sich-seiende) and objective (an-sich-seiende); (2) "das Sein als reiner Begriff an sich selbst". They are concrete, not abstract, because the difference is real, while the separation is not absolute.

(1) in the first case, it is "Begriff an sich", i.e. either pole of the contrary (Subjective and Objective, Reality and Concept, etc): [inorganic nature generally cannot surpass this].

(2) here it is "für-sich-seiende Begriff."

Aristotle, *Prima Philosophia*: concerned with the "most general" concepts (especially Being) which underlie all other concepts; but at the same time the "most general" is equivalent to the "excellent," because only he who knows the most general will know the reasons and causes for things.

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Hegel – stages of thought correspond to the stages of the historical process itself:

(1) primitive man = unconscious (unaware) conceptualization.

(2) first stage of developed society = first stage of consciousness of the forms of thought: formalization.

A. Pragmatic Attitude – usefulness of logic for practical life; concepts as abbreviations of thought;\* concepts for structuring experience.

3) higher development = "concrete universality": the individual or person as universal in all its particular manifestation.

[\* Concepts serve us:

- No-thinking, like feeling, is a mental activity; but the latter, we are inclined to think, dominates us.
- Again, no – we are conscious of a certain universality within us.]
- Universality: mind is more than thinking, or feeling, or willing, or desiring; it is all of these.]

### Dialectic of Concepts:


Example: “dialectic of sense-certainty” in the *Phänomenologie*: upon closer examination, the reports of the senses appear contradictory (eg. night and day; here and now) because the most elementary results are given in the form of conceptualizations; in following sensation in its intentionality (the objects), the “I” appears contradictory and inadequate, because in order to fulfill its own intentionality it must go beyond itself.

### Negativity of the Concept.

Concept as development or process of specific determination: Concept of the dog, e.g., comprises the entire development of the dog from birth to death – but therefore the concept itself cannot be static or fixed, but can be determined only in relation to and against that which is not a dog.

This is true for inorganic nature as well: the rock survives by resisting its environment (e.g., wearing away by water). Thus, all substance is subject, i.e. everything survives as a unit is thus resisting (whether passively as inorganic, or actively as consciousness).

### Introduction:



The ability to transcend all particular forms of life, not to become identical with any one of them (i.e., to preserve self-identity), is freedom: thus it is inevitably connected with universality.

(2)

B. Forms of thought are “mere” forms, imposed on reality and thus foreign to it.

Indivisible unity of form and content – established by Kant in as much as subjectivity constitutes objectivity; but the object remains just as “X” which we can never approach. Hegel requires and shows, by insisting on the equality of Content (Sache, the objects of thought) with Form, that the object will appear as logical object.

The Concept (or The Concept of the Concept): the comprehension of the totality of the world.

Geist, (1): not only essence (as distinct from appearance), but intelligible and rational: “reality is Geist” inasmuch as reality is intelligible and rational; Geist always and only a totality.

(2) historical activity is “Geist” inasmuch as it is made by man; not apart from reality, but forms reality itself; nature also is a “manifestation of Geist” in the sense that what we have in nature is formed and transformed by man.

Grimm’s Dictionary of German language: article on “Geist” (Hildebrand).

Geist: active historical period considered as a totality (material and intellectual), understood as a stage in the development of Reason in history, the progressive realization of freedom.

“Mind” – intellect or intelligence, “subjektive Geist.”

“Correspondence” Theory of Truth:

Assumes the object as “vollendete” in itself; thought must “adjust” itself to the object to attain any knowledge – but, as Kant saw, it is impossible for two such dissimilar things as subject and object to [relate to] each other, and therefore he argued for the constitution of objectivity by the subject: however, the object as it is remains an “X” outside, and therefore Kant’s solution fails.

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“Transcendence” of Reason over common sense and the understanding, e.g. in the transcendence of common sense in scientific thought, which in analyzing the concept of matter, etc. approaches the reality of things themselves.

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If we are to prove the identity of Thought and its Object (the Real), then we must go beyond the conception of the “real” in common sense and discover, e.g. in science, the true reality, which can only be expressed in concepts.



[1] Being as already comprehended as what it is in itself, namely an sich or for us: i.e., it is only we as cognitive subjects who have this concept, and is not Being having it for itself; it is only mere concept, only as object of thought.

[2] in man as a thinking man, concept exists for itself, i.e. Self – consciousness, also conscious existence of the sentient animal. Begriff is be-greifen (com-prende), the activity of integrating all states of existence in full consciousness.

Human activity having become the free conscious activity of man himself is the Begriff für-sich-seiende.

Concept has concept: comprehended and comprehending existence, as in man; in the form of thinking human beings, the concept comes to consciousness of itself.

1) sees progress in the advance in physics from the concept of force to the concept of polarity, because whereas the forms represent a pure abstraction, i.e. An identity abstracted from all difference, the latter shows clearly an example of a concept which represents both “des Unterschiedes, welcher zugleich als ein Untrennbares in der Identität bleibt”. (22)

2) Plato and Aristotle marked the first great (and necessary) step in knowledge when they separated the universal form from all the material and sensual manifestation of it and made it an independent object for purposes of thought (23ff).

3) even when Kantianism marks off the things in themselves as existing apart from thought, they exist as an object of thought (ein Gedankending) and nothing else.

4) the ordinary logic makes the abstract form of things it's material:  $A = A$ , a plant = a plant, and disregards all content; a thing “vielmehr Form in ihm selbst, ja durch sie allein Beseelung und Gehalt hat und daß sie selbst es ist, die nur in den Schein eines Inhalts, so wie damit auch in den Schein eines an diesem Scheine Äußerlichen, umschlägt. Mit dieser Einführung des Inhalts in die logische Betrachtung, sind es nicht die Dinge, sondern die Sache, der Begriff der Dinge, welcher Gegenstand wird.” (30)

5) All particular concepts (Forms), however, are themselves individual determination of the concept itself: “die Bestimmtheit des Begriffs aber ist eine Formbestimmung dieser substantiellen Einheit, ein Moment der Form als Totalität, des Begriffes selbst, der die Grundlage der bestimmten Begriffe ist” (31). This is only a product of thought: and as such it is the most important element of logic.

6) ordinary logic takes for granted its simple yet fundamental distinctions: Form distinct from Content, finite from infinite, etc. but it is precisely the business of logic to examine whether either member of these pairs can be anything actual apart from the other (34).

11-21-66

Kant

Hegel

Understanding

Essence

Reason

Concept

The doctrine of essence develops the dialectical contradictions involved in thinking. The resolution is only in the concept.

Differences in relation: Sein and Wesen

1) Seine Bestimmtheiten ( $A \leftarrow \rightarrow B$ ): relation is an external one.

2) Wesen Bestimmungen ( $A \leftarrow \rightarrow \text{non-}A$ ): relation is an internal one: it's negation of a term is seen to be essential in defining the term.

→ The “B” has become the “non-A” i.e. The Other of A and its Other.

Judgment: “a rose is a plant”. This moves the content into the predicate.

Proposition: “a rose is a plant which...”. The “specific plantness” of the roses related to the rose itself.

Or “man is a rational animal.” The form of the sentence could be the same for the proposition and the judgment, but the proposition would go on to give the entire history of man and show how he developed faculty of rationality. Thus, a true dialectical proposition could not be expressed in a simple sentence, but in an elaborate reflection on history of the process, e.g. of the constitution of man. The judgment is “external” relation: it relates the species to the genus in the mechanical fashion.

Why does chapter II begin with identity?

Because the first requirement of the definition of a thing asks for that enduring identity which persists through various different stages and conditions.

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Plato introduces difference in the Sophists to explain motion, in that something which is in motion is at the same time the same and different.

“Identity is at the same time the whole and the moment of the whole” – the same with difference.

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Formal logic: truth is not at all concerned. It has no content.

Hegel: thought is about reality, “what is” – and always about that. This had been basic to philosophy from the beginning. Why is it so vital in Hegel? (1) Kant and Fichte, had once again, in powerful fashion, eliminated reality as the object of thought; (2) Romanticism had denigrated rationality and had eulogized various forms of immediate intuition.

Why the difficulties with Wesen? Because Wesen is nothing, it is only be process which negates all particular fixed determinations.

Objective logic

Subjective logic

Sein

Wesen

Begriff

Matter-physical



Conscious life-historical

Mediation (organic life)

The process of negation of determinate states, in the world of inorganic life, operates as blind necessity (e.g. Attraction and repulsion, inertia and gravity, etc.). The movement of the whole is toward conscious life (metaphysical expression of evolution) – the Aufhebung of nature in history. (Aristotle: internal telos of nature, in vegetative, animal, and conscious forms).

Dynamics of nature toward consciousness and thus freedom.

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II, 44, 67: “the root of all movement and life”, identity and difference.

The “becoming identical” of something is possible only as a process through various states of difference. (Cf. Encyl., 119, Zus. 2 – Eng., p. 223)

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Absolute Difference – no middle or comparing term – is really only the Law of Identity taken in its negative aspect: “A is A”, i.e. A is absolutely differentiated from all non-A.

Identity and Difference: one cannot be understood without the other (for identity, see immediately above; for difference, one thing is differentiated from another by remaining identical with itself).

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Marcuse, *Hegel's Ontologie* [sometimes: H.O.]

The "being" of the world is to be understood as a "product"-- als ein nichteinfach schon Daseiendes und in seinem Dasein in sich selbst Ruhendes, sondern als immer erst ins Dasein Hervorgetriebenes, Hineingeführtes, "Gesetztes". It is the "product" of "das sichentzweien des Absoluten," its own product.

The becoming of the world (or of being) is not indeterminate: "das Gewordensein (nicht das Sein) ist als ein "Werden zu begreifen"; but: "Das, was schon geworden ist, ist als dieses Gewordensein ein Werden; es muss das werden, was es immer schon war und was es ist." (16)

The "beings" (Seiende) which arise out of the original Totality retain the characteristic of that unity: "die 'bei-sich-selbst-bleibende' Bewegtheit des Sich-selbst-setzens des Gesetzten." (17)

The Totality which unites Subject and Object while preserving the difference between both must not reduce the one to the other in any way. The achievement of this Totality, it is true, will be determined by the Subject's knowing (but all Substance is Subject) –but: "Nur ein Wissen, das sich als die Totalität des Seienden weiss, sich als die Objektivität weiss und zugleich die Subjektivität dieser Objektivität selbst ist, nur ein solches Wissen erfüllt gleichursprünglich den Seinssinn der Subjektivität und Obj. als ihre absolute Einheit." (21)

Totality is not the "sum" of the Seiendes. Rather, "Totalität als das allem Seienden zu Grunde liegende und in ihm gegenwärtige, aller Mannigfaltigkeit Einheit gebende Sein." (24)

The unity-creating transcendental apperception of Kant, elaborated by Hegel and shown to consist of 3 moments (unity as persisting self, unity as the object unified [i.e. Begriff], and the united manifold), must be viewed not as a static principle but as the essence of Being itself: thus, Being as "Bewegtheit": "Nur ein unterscheidendes (the 'I think,' a priori transcendental unity, first separates unity into the opposites thought and existence, etc.), vernehmendes und das Vernommene in sich einbildendes Eins-sein kann im Geschehen der Synthesis, in der 'unendlichen Tätigkeit' sich als selbiges durchhalten... Nur das Sein in der Weise des vernehmenden und wissenden Ich ist eine solche 'sich bewegende Sichselbstgleichheit' (Phan. 17)." (40)

"Weil die 'reine Wesenheit des Seienden' nichts anderes ist als die Geschehende. Synthesis des Einen und Mannigfaltigen, des Subjektiven und Obj., deshalb kann die Synthesis des urteilenden menschlichen Subjekts a priori die Wahrheit des Seins zum Ausdruck bringen. 'Denken und Sein' sind ihrem Seinssinn nach nicht etwas Verschiedenes, sondern dasselbe..." (41)

The "world" is not purely the "object" of the knowing I; "sondern sie 'gehört' ganz ursprünglich zu seinem Sein, als die Negativität, durch die es allein erst Positivität ist, als die Mannigfaltigkeit, durch deren Synthesis es überhaupt erst ist-- ..."

Hegel's central task unites at bottom with the categories of traditional ontology: the "sich-bewegende Sichselbstgleichheit" (see above) amounts to: "das Zu-sich-selbst-kommen und Bei-sich-selbst-bleiben im Anderssein." (43)

"Der Leitfaden für die Ableitung der Viewheit [sic: Veilheit?] des aus der ursprünglichen Einheit des Absoluten muss in der 'reinen Wesenheit' des Seienden selbst liegen und aus ihr heraus verständlich gemacht werden; die reine Wesenheit des Seienden muss als Entspringen-lassen der Vielheit begriffen werden. (45-6) Diese einfache "Einheit des Seins wird nun als in sich unterschieden bestimmt, und zwar als Sichselbstgleichheit im Anderssein." (46)

"Das Sein selbst hat den fundamentalen Charakter, in sich zweispältig, 'gebrochen' zu sein: es ist nur im Anderssein, als Sichselbstgleichheit in der Veränderung; es trägt stets seine 'Negativität' bei sich, ist seinem innersten Wesen nach Negativität. Erst diese wesentliche Gebrochenheit und Zweispältigkeit des Seins ist der Grund des Seins als Bewegtheit, als Geschehen; sie erst begründet *die* Vielheit des Seienden als verschiedene Weisen des Seins." (47-8)

"'Unmittelbar' ist das Seiende, bevor es sein 'Wesen' und seinen 'Grund' gewonnen hat: in der jeweils auftretende, ihm zufallenden Bestimmtheit seines Daseins; das Seiende, wie es sich noch nicht aus seinem 'Wesen' in die 'Existenz' herausgestellt hat, wie es nur da ist, ohne sich schon selbst erwirkt und verwirklicht zu haben." (51)

In the section of the Wiss. der Logik dealing with "Etwas," the "bestimmte Seiende," Hegel gives the first definite instance of "Sein als Bewegtheit": "Dasein .... bestimmt sich wesentlich zum Daseienden..." (italics added). (52-3) -

Process of formation of "Etwas": "Indem das Dasein sich in seiner Negativität darstellt und herausstellt, in dieser Negativität aus sich heraus ist, wird es überhaupt erst Daseiendes, Etwas. Das Daseiende grenzt sich selbst in seinem Anderssein aus und kommt dadurch erst zu sich: die Grundbestimmung des Daseins ist 'geworden zu seyn'; Dasein ist nur als 'Gewordenes', als 'Resultat'."

"Die Einigung der absoluten Differenz von Ansichsein und Dasein durch die Fassung des Ansichseins als sich verwirklichende Mächtigkeit (dynamis qua potentia) macht diesen Begriff zum Zentrum der hegelschen Ontologie." (54)

The dictum "Substance is Subject" is not an arbitrary or subjective choice, but follows necessarily from the conception of "Etwas" (i.e., all determinate beings) which must remain in itself (or else face extinction in the Other) and yet must develop itself in specific determinations (as Da-sein rather than Sein): "das Subjekt-sein ist die eigentliche Weise des Beisichselbstbleibens im Anderssein." (56)

(\*alles Seiende wesentlich in der Differenz von Ansichsein und Dasein befindet"--p. 57)

## "Etwas": Summary

Positive sense of Ansichseins: what a being remains in itself as against "all accidental determinations of its existence"; its contrary concept is Anderssein.

Negative sense of Ansichseins: its essence is only abstract and not its own product; the contrary of this is Fürsichsein.

The "Etwas" is thus a duality of Ansichs and Anderssein; but its "Anderssein" is more properly "Sein-für-Anderes", the opposite of Fürsichsein. (59) Crucial importance of Hegel's concept of infinity: that infinity which is set over against the finitude of determinate beings as something totally beyond them is the "bad infinity" of, e.g., religion: "Das Unendliche ist kein Jenseits des Endlichen mehr, von woher das Endliche in seinem Sein bestimmt wäre, sondern das Endliche trägt seine eigene Unendlichkeit in sich, als die Unendlichkeit seines Geschehens." (67)

"Die Kategorie des Fürsichseins ist vielleicht die umfassendste Kategorie der hegelschen Ontologie. Fürsichsein bedeutet zugleich die abstrakteste, allgemeinste und die konkreteste, eigentlichste Weise des Seins; ... Wenn ein Seiendes Fürsichsein ist, dann behauptet und bewährt es sich als dieses Eine in allem Anderssein und aller Negativität. Die Einheit des Fürsichseins bedeutet also nicht die Auflösung der absoluten Differenz, sondern nur ihre 'Aufhebung', in welcher sie gerade als Differenz aufbewahrt und geeinigt ist." (69)

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The "Lehre vom Sein" seems to end exactly where it began: "Das Sein ist die abstrakte Gleichgültigkeit." But this is not the case, for we have discovered two fundamental traits of Being: "Negativität ist der Grund der Bewegtheit des Seins, und diese Negativität ist nur als Bewegtheit." (75) The abstract equivalence that is attained at the end of the "Lehre vom Sein" is achieved "nur im Aufheben, Negieren jeder faktischen Bestimmtheit, im Zurückkommen auf sich selbst durch das Hinausgehen über jede Bestimmtheit." (75)

Thus, the condition of Sein, at the end, is "unmittelbar da-seiendes Gegenwärtigkeit," or "absolute indifference," i.e. the negation of all determinations of existence. The "Etwas" has collapsed back into Being. In order for it to develop into a something, a further realization arises, namely the necessity of a permanence which endures through all particular and transitory determinations. HM regards this as a new formulation of Aristotle's *to ti ên einai*.

"Diese Pflanze hier ist jetzt da als Keim, jetzt als Blüte, jetzt als Frucht. Aber sie ist weder Keim, noch Blüte, noch Frucht; sie ist dies auch nicht dann wenn sie unmittelbar als Keim, Blüte, Frucht ist, and sie ist auch nicht dies alles zusammen. In der ganzen Dimension der unmittelbar da-seienden Gegenwärtigkeit -- das war das Ergebnis der bisherigen Untersuchung -- wird das Sein dieses Seienden nicht angetroffen, es sei denn als die 'negative Totalität' all der jeweiligen unmittelbaren Bestimmtheiten: die Pflanze ist eben dies: nicht Keim, Blüte, Frucht zu sein, in dem was sie nicht ist doch zu sein, dieses 'nicht' auf sich zu 'beziehen'. Der Keim wird Blüte, wird Frucht, und in all dem ist als 'bleibend' die Pflanze, ja sie wird allererst darin. Um aber in

allen diesen Bestimmtheiten gegenwärtig sein zu können, muss die Pflanze vor allen diesen einzelnen Bestimmtheiten immer schon gewesen sein. Schon der Keim ist ja Pflanze! Die Pflanze entsteht ja nicht aus dem Keim; nur die Blüte and dann die Frucht. Das 'Sein' der Pflanze ist also ein 'Wesen': es ist zunächst nicht anders zu bestimmen als 'das was das Sein (immer schon) war' -- *to ti ên einai*. (78)

“... das Dasein ist zugleich Voraussetzung und Folge des Wesens; das Wesen wird nur in und aus dem Dasein -- und zugleich ist das Dasein, was es ist, nur als vom Wesen 'gesetztes', es hat nur durch das Wesen Bestand, Grund und Einheit. (80)

What is the connection of Wesen and Dasein? To say that Dasein becomes what it is not through itself but through Wesen (see above) is not to say that Dasein is "dissolved" in Wesen, for Wesen itself only exists in and with Unwesen, i.e. Schein ("der Schein ist das Wesen selbst in der Bestimmtheit des Seins"). The necessity of the process of Wesen ist: Ohne dieses Hinausgehen und Aufheben wäre jede unmittelbare Bestimmtheit des Seienden nur ein momentaner gleichgültiger Zustand einer in ständigem Wechsel gleichgültig perennierenden Materie. Wenn das unmittelbar Daseiende wirklich ist, dann hat es dies sein Sein nur durch die das unmittelbare Dasein aufhebende, über es hinausgehende Bewegung der Reflexion. (83)

\*\* This process, however, also constitutes Wesen itself. “Das Wesen ist, nichts ausser dieser Bewegung, und diese Bewegung selbststeht in seinsmassiger Verbundenheit mit dem unmittelbaren Dasein: auch die Unmittelbarkeit ist nur diese Bewegung selbst.” (84)

“Das Wesen trägt in sich selbst den absoluten Widerspruch: es ist nur gegen eine vorgefundene Bestimmtheit, indem es sie negiert, in sich aufhebt, damit hat es aber immer auch seine eigene Seinsmöglichkeit aufgehoben, sich selbst negiert. Negiert nicht etwa als Wesen überhaupt, sondern nur als 'reines', eigenständiges, vom Daseienden als Gesetzten unterschiedenes Wesen.” True, the plant is, only as not seed, blossom, etc; but it also has no being whatsoever outside or behind the seed, blossom, etc.; “sie ist nur als die immer sich selbst gleiche Beziehung dieser Bestimmtheiten auf das Geschehen ihrer selbst, als ein Vermitteln, Halten dieser Bestimmtheiten, als ein immer gleiches Sich-verhalten zu ihnen. Sein im Sinne des Wesens geschieht als immer sich selbst gleiches Sich-verhalten in jeder jeweiligen seienden Bestimmtheit.” (86-7)

#### Present relevance of Hegel:

- 1a) the concept of the concept; conceptual or speculative thought
- 1b) antipathy toward pragmatism and empiricism
- 2) priority of the whole over all particulars

3) dialectic.

### Opposition and Contradiction: illustrated in Marx.

The commodity. Until capitalism, the unity of material and labor.

In capitalism, a dual nature: 1) use value (qualitative), 2) exchange value (quantitative).

In the market, qualitative value appears as quantitative; two different commodities are exchanged for each other. So, the question is: What is the “mysterious” thing which can equalize the two?

There may appear to be only a difference between two commodities, e.g., a bed and a machine gun; within the market they lose their qualitative distinctiveness (use value) and appear as to opposed X’s.

The “common something” is abstract labor, the quantitative measure (labor time).

### Essence

In relation to Being, Essence is determined as the Essential; Being, the Other of Essence, is the unessential. We have “fallen back” into the sphere of Determinate Being (Dasein)

What is this “Schein”, this “immediate non-existence”, which exists only through the mediation of its negation [Essential]”?

It is –

- a) the phenomena of skepticism, which have no “Being”;
- b) appearance in Kantianism, distinct from the thing-in-itself;
- c) the representations of the Leibnizian monad.

But this “immediacy of not-being” which is Schein is the same as Essence, and the immediacy of Schein is the immediacy of Essence (bot. p. 23). Schein is essence itself in a determinate way.

Now that we have seen that Essence actually contains Schein as its “infinite eternal movement”, we see that Essence is Reflection, “the showing of itself in itself.”

### REFLECTION:



Becoming in Being has Being for the “basis” of determinateness; in Becoming in Essence, Being is Schein, Not-being, nothing; therefore becoming in essence has no basis in being and is thus only movement (see above) and nothing else.

“Essence is reflection.” (25)


Essence is not a permanent subtraction (Aristotle) or the Platonic idea (wherein Essence is Being), for Essence is only movement, not Being: “Being is Not-being in Essence” (23; [490]). But Dasein is not “dissolved” in Essence, because the Essential only exists in and with the Unessential, i.e., Schein (“Schein is Essence itself in the determinateness of Being,” p. 24).

*Encyclopedia*, ~112 Zusatz:

“... Essence of things: a phrase which only means that things instead of being the left in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, something else.”

“Everything, it is said, has an Essence: that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves.”

Essence = “the permanent in things.”



- 1) Essence - separate from Being
- 2) Therefore Being = Unessential
- 3) Therefore Being = Schein (Essence-less Being)
- 4) Schein is Schein of Essence

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Being: “abstract equivalence”. Quality and quantity have “disappeared”, or rather qualitative quantity (measure) appears only as pure content-less determination, i.e. “Empty difference” (yet obviously a “result”, not the same as the original Being), “concrete” in that being has mediated itself through the negation of all determinations (negation of negation).

\*The “an-sich” of indifference is not self determining but only external being – determined and becoming – determined (I, 396-7) (IV, 469).

As indifference, the absolute has these deficiencies: 1) the determination are not determinations through themselves; 2) positing of deficiencies is something immediate, not the mediation of the absolute with itself. The totality of determinations are self-canceling, a universal contradiction: it is “Fürsichserende” just because of this. There is once more unity in Being, rather than universal difference, but a “negative absolute unity” (negation of negation) [I, 398; IV, 471]. This is Essence.

Dasein and Existence: the Dasein is an unstable collection of quality, quantity, etc.; existence is more concrete in the sense that the existent thing can persist despite changes in quality, quantity, and so forth.

Posit = to establish on the basis of something else; the negation of immediacy (the cause posits the effect).

The posited something is, in reflection, understood as negated: its existence is precisely in being negated, and this process of negation is its mediation and its persistence.

Example: The Dream

The immediate being of dream does not persist; in reflection, we negate its immediate being and posit the dream as a dream, i.e. As other than reality (whereas this separation did not exist in the immediate dream).

Existence: the unity of independent matters, in which the Thing is only nullity, i.e. exists only in otherness.

p. 127 The Thing is self-contradictory, therefore it is Appearance: it is only an Appearance, if it is simply the result of independent matters [reality is possible only when this contradiction is resolved]. Yet it is vital to emphasize – as Hegel does, p.128 - that in saying it is only Appearances we are not degrading appearance below existence.

p. 128 Existence = absolute negativity. Existence is the loss of all determinations (into independent matters) in the sense that they have all been made relative, i.e. Each is what it is only in relation to an Other. The “Nichtigkeit der Existenz”: one cannot say at anything in a particular time and place, “that is the real thing”, for everything seems to be defined and determined by something else and not in terms of its independence. If I have my existence only in relation to something else, then “nullity” is the very core of my existence. [Much like existentialism: “Man is Nothing”; but Hegel does not make a *Weltanschauung* out of it!]

p.129 It is the very essence of things to be appearance because things happen themselves this nullity.

Law of Appearance: HM: entire presentation deals with the Kantian opposition between knowing subject and the object known.

Two moments:

a) existent mediated through its negation – it's negation, the knowing subject which posits (see and of first paragraph, P.130) the existent.

-> The term appearance presupposes “appearance to” something, first paragraph, the relation of being posited constitutes the persistence of things.

The One and the Other here are not two things but Subjectivity and Objectivity; in reciprocal determination: there is no consciousness without an object consciousness, and objectivity is made possible by the unifying activity of consciousness.

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“It is negation or in its other it relates itself to itself.”

With slave and master: the slave is only slave (i.e., himself) with relation to the master.

The master posits the slave; the slave has his persistence only in the positedness by the Other.

There are objects whose persistence consists in positedness by an Other: but in this act of positing is itself transcended: As soon as the master posits the slave his own independence is *aufgehoben*, for he has lost his independence. This, according to Hegel, is the universal law of appearance.

The whole thing is “Schein” because of this reciprocal positing.

“Sein als Bewegtheit”: in this section of the Logic dealing with “Etwas,” Hegel says: “Dasein... *bestimmt sich wesentlich zum Daseyenden ....*” (italics added)

The “Dasein” of each “Etwas” determines itself as “Insichsein” (H.O., p. 57)

R+R [*Reason and Revolution*], p. 131 categories do not “pass into” one another; each unfolds as the necessary development – opposite of the other.

Für-sich:

1) every determination of a thing is posited by itself.

2) every det. of a thing is a reflection of its essence, “infinite self – relation.”

If Hegel can really show that Being “internalizes itself” in becoming essence, then he will have proven that objective being is subjective being.

R+R, p. 43: “Reflection is the process in which an existent constitutes itself as the unity of the subject. It has an essential unity that contrasts with the passive changeable unity of the something; it is not to determinate but determining itself. All determination is here posited by the Essence itself and stands under its determining power.”

Sein: “das nicht zu seyn, was es ist, und das zu seyn, was es nicht ist”.

Condition of Sein: “unmittelbar da-seineder Gegenwärtigkeit.”

a) but we observe a plant as seed, leaves, flowers, fruit etc.

b) in order that this may be possible, if further development of Sein is necessary; and this must be a permanent which into worse as the ground of particular determinations: this will be the plant; in general: essence.

c) this explains the “Vergangenheit” of the Seinde: it becomes what it is, e.g. The plant, which means that it becomes what it always was. (H.O., 78).

Dasein is both the presupposition and consequence of Wesen (again note the Aristotelian strain); but Dasein is only what it is throu the “positing” of Wesen in it – it is Wesen which will be both ground and unity of the each da-seiendes. (H.O., 80)

Reflection: in the “Lehre vom Sein”, the constitution of an “Etwas” was seen to involve the incessant passing over to an Other, and movement remains within itself, does not go over to an other; the mediation is infinite relation to self, infinite return to self within itself. This is the “Sich-Selbst-Gleichheit” of Reflection.

(Reflection is not a mental process: used image of light reflected in a mirror back to itself.)

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Jedes Wesen ist bestimmtes Wesen (Wesenheit). But how? What is the connection of Wesen and Dasein? To say that Dasein becomes what it is not in itself but in Wesen, is not to say that Dasein is “dissolved” in Wesen, for Wesen itself only exists in and with Unwesen, i.e. Schein (der Schein ist das Wesen selbst in der Bestimmtheit der Seins”). This process is a “Hinausgehen über das Unmittelbare” but always returning to itself.

H.O.

Determinant Being is at the same time presupposition and consequence of Essence. Essence will be only in and out of det. Being – and at the same time det. Being is what it is only as “posited” by Essence, only then it has det. Being existence (Bestand), ground and unity.

How does reflection constitute its determined unity as the “Bewegtheit des Wesens”? Essence is always Essence of determinate Being: it is only the determinate Being internalized, gone into itself.

-> “das Wesen ist nur in und mit seinem Unwesen.”

The immediate determinate Being is the presupposition of Essence, “that out of which the essence comes.”

Reflection: in order to be able to posit itself in relation as essence, to bind itself to it and to be able to hold itself in itself, reflection has always gone out over the immediate determinate Being: in order to be able to be a plant as blossom, to be able to hold the blossom in the Being of the plant, the plant in order as blossom must already go beyond the blossom, must be more than the blossom; it must always also be the coming fruit, as it always also had been the blossom. (83)

The “ground” of Dasein in Essence: but not only the existence (Bestehen) of immediate Dasein first constitutes itself in the: – out and returning movement, but also – the existence of essence itself.

Essence will be only as this movement and is only in it.

#### Wesen:

Seine Bewegung besteht darin, die Negation oder Bestimmung an ihm zu setzen, dadurch sich Daseyn zu geben, und das als unendliches Fürsichseyn zu werden, was es an sich ist. (484) (II, 17). [Greek *to ti en enai* = Latin *quod quid erat esse*]

First. Wesen a “Resultat” of the “Bewegung des Seins” (nicht unmittelbar an und für sich); Being which has “passed away.”

Second: it is “aufgehobene Sein,” the first negation of Being (determinate Negation) as such, Being is determined as the Unessential, Essence is defined as the Essential; this process of determination by an Other, however, has caused Essence to fall into the realm of Dasein.

The Sein in this second stage of Dasein is an-und-für-sich Sein. But it is determined so only in relation to an Other (the Unessential) and therefore this determination is not the work of Dasein itself:

“Es ist Daber unbestimmt, was zum Wesentlichen oder Unwesentlichen gehört.” (487)

What is the pure Sein whose moment is unwesentliches Dasein? It is sein = unwesen, immediately which is nothing in and for itself, and therefore it is that which only “shows”: “Das Seyn ist Schein” (487)

Next step: to show that the manifestations of Schein are actually determinations of Wesen itself and are aufgehoben in it.

“Being is not being in essence” – this is the negative nature of essence, that it has been only as not being (490). This pure not being is simple immediacy and abstract equivalence, which essence has as its negative nature: thus we see that these characteristics, formerly attributed to pure being, here belong to essence; “hierdurch ist das Wesen selbst das Sein.”

Not the same immediacy, “seiende Unmittelbarkeit” but “vermittelte oder reflektirte Unmittelbarkeit” (Schein and Reflection).

Thus two “moments” of Wesen:

- 1) an sich seiende Negativität
- 2) reflektirte Unmittelbarkeit

Wesen is thus “negative relation to itself,” “abstassendes Negerin ihrer selbst” and Schein is the negation against the negative (Wesen, the negation of Sein). It is the identity of negativity and immediacy (491-2).

Recap:

Being (immediate.)  $\leftrightarrow$  Nothing (imm.) = Becoming

Essence (imm.)  $\leftrightarrow$  Unessential, Schein (imm.) = Essence (med: Reflection)

“Schein is only Schein, the infinite internal movement of Essence (negativity and immediacy).

[Finite = Positedness; Infinite = Reflection]

Reflection: “die Bewegung des Werdens und Übergehens, das in sich selbst bleibt.” In it all difference is only Schein; whereas the Werden des Seins was constructed only in relation to an Other, here there is no other, or rather the other has being only as negative relation to self (Schein); this “sich-selbst-Gleichheit,” i.e. Immediacy. Also, Schein is not a first principle, or a substrate, of reflection; it is simply thus self movement of Wesen itself: its Werden is “reflektirende Bewegung.” (493)

It is a movement from nothing to nothing (both Schein), infinite negative relation to self; as this “übergehen von Nichts zu Nichts” it meets the other, Sein, which is accordingly just this “Bewegung des Nichts zu Nichts.”

1) positing reflection (positedness: negation of the state of return to self) as reflection, all positing will be return to self (i.e. negation of itself; this return will aufgehoben the negative and its Other, immediacy; negation of the negative as such, therefore positive, as presupposition.

[setzende, voraussetzen]

“In dem Voraussetzen bestimmt die Reflexion die Rückkehr in sich, als das Negative ihrer selbst, als dasjenige, dessen Aufheben das Wesen ist.” (495)

Transcended immediacy is the return to self, and thus the coming of essence to itself; the “going out over the immediate” is the coming to itself (28). The return to itself is presupposition, and also immediacy; thus, this immediacy, as presupposition, is like an Other, and reflection is the external reflection.

External Reflection:

a) immediate

b) reflected in itself                      determinate immediate

In positing, Reflection discovered he presupposition, i.e. The immediate (the given?). This immediate presupposition is thus the first characteristic of established Reflection which in turn determines the second, i.e., that the return to self of reflection refers to it's not – being, i.e. the immediate. Reflection overcomes the antagonism with its negation, the immediate, but positing itself as identical with the immediate, i.e. “essential immediacy.” (498)

3) Determining Reflection

In Essence, positedness = Determinate Being. Dasein has negation of Sein, Gesetzsein has negation of Essence. Dasein (Det. of Being) as quality, passed away into an Other; but determinant of reflection (essence), as positedness, is negation “which has negatedness for foundation”, is equal therefore to itself and persists thereby, is “essential and not transitory determinateness”.

(Sect. 2): positiveness originally is mere negatedness in general; external reflection, as we have seen, posits itself as determinateness, i.e. Negation; in union with it, therefore positedness is negation of negatedness in general.

Positedness is essentiality only in so far as it is “the unity of itself and of its Other”.

*Reflexionsbestimmungen:*

(IV, 505-6) It is a determinant of reflection (essence) which is expressed in the law of identity (Alles ist sich selbst gleich,  $A = A$ ); why are there determinants of being not expressed also in this fashion? E.g. Alles ist, Alles hat eine Qualität, etc.

The crucial difference is: “Allein eine Bestimmtheit des Seyns ist wesentlich ein Übergehen ins Entgegengesetzte; die negative einer jeden Bestimmtheit ist so notwendig als sie selbst; ...”  
 There is no “Übergehen” to an Other in the determinateness of Reflection – they are all essentially self-relating; and in this sense they carry the form of the Law of Identity even in themselves.

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Proposition: " A rose is a plant which..." [Speculative proposition in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, God is an all-powerful being]

Judgment: “A rose is a plant.”

In the first, the content is the relation (two sides of the proposition are identical); it is a determinate relationship – does not go beyond the particular subject of the proposition. The judgment, on the other hand, has its content in the predicate which is a general determination, the relation in it is the content only.

#### CRITICISMS:

A) the fact that something (something existent) is used as the subject of the proposition, which “resuscitates” the sphere of Being, is misleading, because it has been shown that the subject cannot persist as of determinant of Being (e.g. Quality), but only as a determinant of Reflection (identity, etc.).

B) But, with reference to the first paragraph above, the determinates of reflection do determine themselves against an Other, namely, each other: the various laws (identity and contradiction) contradict themselves.

#### A. Identity

Essence – immediacy of reflection, i.e. aufgehobene immediacy; es ist sich selbst gleich in seiner absoluten Negativität; Wesen = Identität (negative).

p. 508 – Summary of difference between immediacy of Being and immediacy of Reflection (Wesen); see also p. 516.

Traditional analysis abstracts identity from difference and vice versa, then combines them in mysterious way:

“Man muß ... diese Betrachtung von Allem, was ist, an ihm selbst zeigt, daß es in seiner Gleichheit mit sich sich ungleich und widersprechend, und in seiner Verschiedenheit, in seinem Widerspruche, mit sich identisch, und an ihm selbst, diese Bewegung des Übergehens einer



dieser Bestimmungen in die andere ist, und dieß darum, weil jede an ihr selbst das Gegentheil ihrer selbst ist.”

New concept of Identity “einfache sich auf sich beziehende Negativität” [e.g., same as Wesen]

Essence, as absolute negativity, is that which negates itself; the Other of Essence, the positing of difference, is the positing of what is not (“Das Unterscheiden ist das Setzen des Nichtseyns”); but it is its own not – being [show is the show of essence], and thus it has its own not – being in itself; thus essence (identity) is absolute difference.

\* p. 510 “Sie [Wesen as Identität] ist somit die Identität als der mit sich identische Unterschied. Der Unterschied ist aber nur identisch mit sich, insofern er nicht die Identität, sondern absolute Nichtidentität ist. Absolut aber ist die Nichtidentität, insofern sie nichts von ihr Anderes enthält, sondern nur sich selbst, das heißt, insofern sie absolute Identität mit sich ist.”

Thus identity, which was first seen as the totality of Essence, now appears only as a moment of Reflection, identity as against absolute difference.

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In ordinary logic, the formulation  $A = A$  is nothing but an empty tautology. But even there one can find a further truth, namely that identity is only identity as opposed to difference; it is determined negatively, i.e., as against that which difference is.

One cannot deduce the abstract  $A = A$  from experience, as it is sometimes thought, for in experience one finds only identity bound up with differences.

Also, when we begin, “A is...” we expect something different to be added; there is a “hidden necessity” in the expression to complete a movement to the different (one feels the necessity of saying “A is A” rather than simply “A”). But when it is completed, “A is A,” we immediately feel the emptiness of the expression, and we see that this identity is simply nothing, negativity.

2) The alternative form of identity, i.e. The Law of Contradiction, shows the movement and negativity explicitly. Identity is expressed here as negation of negation. One and the same “A” is split into “A” and “not-A”, and this is then negated.

p.515: “Die Identität ist also als diese Unterschiedenheit in einer Beziehung oder als der einfache Unterschied an ihnen selbst hier dargestellt.”

“Der Satz der Identität selbst aber enthält, wie an ihm gezeigt wurde, die Reflexions-Bewegung, die Identität als Verschwinden des Andersseyns.

B. Difference

“Hier in der Sphäre der Reflexion tritt der Unterschied als reflektirter auf, der so gesetzt ist, wie er an sich ist.” (p. 516)

Identity and Difference, are both the whole and a moment of the whole; and

“Dies ist als die wesentliche Natur der Reflexion und als bestimmter Urgrund aller Thätigkeit und Selbstbewegung zu betrachten.” (pp. 516-7) [but see p. 546]

### Variety

Identity, as absolute Difference, has two moments: (a) Difference in itself, (b) the negative of itself, reflected Difference. Every negation immediately transcends itself, and in its determination reflects (only) itself.

“Das Unterschiedene besteht als gegen einander gleichgültig verschiedenes, weil es identisch mit sich ist, weil die Identität seinen Boden und Element ausmacht; oder das Verschiedene ist das, was es ist, eben nur in seinem Gegentheile, der Identität.” (p. 517)

Sein - seen as Grund of negation (Dasein)

Wesen – identity (reflected immediacy, Wesen) as Grund of negative (Gesetztsein)

Both identity and difference, since both contained the other as moment, are not determined as different against one another; thus, Difference is purely external to them. This external difference is a variety (the sphere of Gesetztsein, determinateness as negation or negation as negation – external reflection).

Posited externally, identity and difference appear as reflection in itself and external reflection; each is determined against the other. But external identity is mere likeness, external difference Unlikeness. They are determinations of external reflection.

Reflection in itself is identity – as posited, i.e., without its essential relation to external reflection – i.e., as indifferent to the latter; external reflection is determined (bestimmte) difference. Neither are “an und für sich”

Likeness is Identity as Gesetztsein

Unlikeness is Difference as äußerlich

- both are a product of the viewpoint of a “third”, the comparing term.

The comparison is expressed: “things are like in such-and-such respects, difference in such-and-such respects.”

Both, however, are determinations of differences; both are determinations as unlike the Other, and exist only in this relation; therefore, both are like.

This is then “negative Einheit” (p. 521).

Further, since they are only likeness and unlikeness from the point of view of the comparing term, i.e., something other than themselves, likeness is not like itself but an Other, therefore unlike; and vice versa. Both are both themselves and their others; they disappear as essential determinations because of this movement.

They are not subsistent, only moments of negative unity, viz. Opposition.

The “proposition of variety” – all things are different – collapses when it is shown that the proposition hides the unity of two moments – likeness (in that all things are things) and unlikeness (the assumption of the proposition). They are thus contradictory.

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(p. 525) Difference = determinate Reflection. Unity of Identity and Variety.

↳ Likeness – as reflected, Positive  
 ↳ Unlikeness – as reflected, Negative

Each is independent, because unlike Likeness and Unlikeness, which collapsed into each other, each has its other in itself: “Jedes bezieht sich auf sich selbst, nur als sich beziehend auf sein Anderes. Dieß hat die doppelte Seite; jedes ist Beziehung auf sein Nichtseyn als Aufheben dieses Andersseyns in sich; so ist sein Nichtseyn nur ein Moment in ihm.”

3) The reason that opposition persists, whereas variety was shown to be only one of its moments, is that each side of the opposition is only in relation to its not – being, its other. This is why it can constitute “eine unity”, “Eine Reflexion” (p. 527) without falling apart into its opposed moments.

“Jedes est so überhaupt erstens insofern das Anders ist; es ist durch das Andere, durch sein eigenes Nichtseyn, das was es ist, es ist nur Gesetzseyn; zweitens es ist insofern das Andere nicht ist; es ist durch das Nichtseyn des Anderen was es ist; es ist Reflexion in sich.” (p. 527)

Thus, both are both positive and negative (each is both by virtue of what it is and what it is not);

\*\*Thus here: “das Positive und Negative ist die Reflexionsbestimmung an und für sich” (p. 528)

The positive is what it is by opposing its other, negating reflection; its own positedness consists in transcending positedness, i.e. an essential relation to an Other (it must be what it is, not only what it is not).

The negative is what it is by opposing its other, the positive; it is “das für sich bestehende Entgegengesetzte.” (p. 529)

In themselves they are either positive or negative; but since they are such only in relation to their other, this relation itself constitutes their Being – in – self, and they are both an and für sich.

Lastly, since this reflection is essential to them, there must be a base which contains both and is indifferent to both (“ein nur verschiedenes, unmittelbares Dasein”).

### C. Contradiction

The Positive subsists in so far as it excludes (by transcending) all positedness (negation) but “by excluding the negative it makes itself into the negative of something” – and is thus an absolute contradiction (p. 536).

The same with the Negative: as negative, in opposition to all otherness, it is self – relation; but as such it is positive, self – relating. Also, absolute contradiction.

Contradiction is the same: positedness or negation as self – relation.

Both the positive and negative “ist schlechthin das Uebergehen oder veilmehr das sich Uebersetzen seiner in sein Gegentheil” (p. 537).

\*\*The result is not nothing, because “die sich selbst ausschliessender Reflexion ist zugleich setzende Reflexion” (p. 537).

As posited, the two sides of the Contradiction are only in themselves; but in determining themselves as against their Other, they are for themselves; the aufgehobene of the other, as positedness, is also a positing, but “nicht Gesetzseyn als aufgehobene Unmittelbarkeit, sondern als aufgehobenes Gesetzseyn.” (p. 538). Das Aufheben dieses Gesetzseyns ist daher nicht wieder Gesetzseyn als das Negative eines Andern, sondern ist das Zusammengehen mit sich selbst, das positive Einheit mit sich ist.” (p. 539)

Thus: “Sie ist die Einheit des Wesens, durch die Negation nicht eines Andern, sondern ihrer selbst identisch mit sich zu seyn.” (p. 539)

The independent sides of the contradiction have been aufgehobene, and the contradiction resolves itself – but not simply into any underlying basis, but into its basis (ground) – the unity (ground), “sich selbst als Negatives bestimmt, aber in diesem Gesetzseyn unmittelbar sich selbst gleich und mit sich zusammengegangen ist.”

### Wesen as Ground

The transcended positedness this is still a positedness, and thus Essence as Ground is a positedness, “ein Gewordenes”; the collapse of the contradictory elements, positive and negative, into their Ground - since Essence is Ground – is not a collapse into nothing, but is self – coincidence, “mit sich identische Wesen” (p. 541).

“Das Wesen ist Grund, als in dieser seiner Negation identisch mit sich selbst und positiv.” (p. 540)

\* “Die Wahrheit ist das Positive als das mit dem Objecte übereinstimmende Wissen, aber sie ist nur diese Gleichheit mit sich, insofern das Wissen sich negativ gegen das Andere verhalten, das Object durchdringen und die Negation, die es ist, aufgehoben hat.” (p. 543)

Law of Excluded Middle: everything is either A or not-A; there is no third. Hegel says, its Third is present in the law itself – namely, A! (As distinct from +A and –A).

The “truth” of the three laws of thought was completed in the discussion of Contradiction. This can be formulated in a proposition also:

\* “Alle Dinge sind an sich selbst widersprechend, und zwar in dem Sinne, daß dieser Satz gegen die übrigen vielmehr die Wahrheit und das Wesen der Dinge ausdrücke.” (p. 545)

\*\* “Denn die Identität ihm [der Widerspruch] gegenüber ist nur die Bestimmung des einfachen Unmittelbaren, des todten Seyns; er aber ist die Wurzel aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit; nur insofern etwas in sich selbst einen Widerspruch hat, bewegt es sich, hat Trieb und Thätigkeit.” (p. 546) (cf. 516-7)

“Die äußerliche sinnliche Bewegung selbst ist sein unmittelbares Daseyn. Es bewegt sich etwas nur, nicht indem es in diesem Jetzt hier ist, und in einem andern Jetzt dort, sondern indem es in einem und demselben Jetzt hier und nicht hier, indem es in diesem Hier zugleich ist und nicht ist. Man muß den alten Dialektiken die Widersprüche zugeben, die sie in der Bewegung aufzeigen, aber daraus folgt nicht, daß darum die Bewegung nicht ist, sondern vielmehr daß die Bewegung der daseyende Widerspruch selbst ist.” (p. 547)

This “inner, characteristic self – movement” which is the result of contradiction, is the fact that something is both itself and the negative of itself = Entelechy.

“Das spekulative Denken besteht nur darin, daß das Denken den Widerspruch und in ihm sich selbst festhält, nicht aber daß es sich, wie es dem Vorstellen geht, von ihm beherrschen und durch ihn sich seine Bestimmungen nur in andere oder in Nichts auflösen läßt.” (p. 547-8)

“... jede Bestimmung, jedes Konkrete, jeder Begriff ist wesentlich eine Einheit unterschiedener und unterscheidbarer Momente, die durch den bestimmten, wesentlichen Unterschied in widersprechende übergehen.” (p. 550)

“Das Ding, das Subjekt, der Begriff ist nun eben diese negative Einheit selbst; es ist ein an sich selbst Widersprechendes, aber ebenso sehr der aufgelöste Widerspruch; es ist der Grund, der seine Bestimmungen enthält und trägt.” (p. 550)

The usual logic has it that Being – that which underlies all finite things – is the Ground of the Absolute. For Hegel, it is the opposite: “Das Nichtseyn [i.e., the contradictory and finite nature] des Endlichen ist das Seyn des Absoluten.” (p. 551)

### Der Grund

1. “Das Wesen ist nur diese seine Negativität, welche die reine Reflexion ist. Es ist diese reine Negativität als die Rückkehr des Seyns in sich;” ...
2. Essence is determined an sich (for us) as the ground in which Sein has constituted itself, but is not yet posited as such by or through itself, and in so far as that is true, it is not yet Ground.
3. Wesen as Grund is the last, and the true, determination of Wesen: the independent and opposed determinant (especially positive and negative) have been resolved into this he unity. It is determinant as aufgehobene Bestimmung; a positing which transcends itself in its positing; it “bestimmt sich als das Nichtbestimmte” and in this positing which always transcends itself remains identical with itself in its negativity.
4. “Die Reflexion ist die reine Vermittlung überhaupt, der Grund ist die reale Vermittlung des Wesens mit sich.”
5. Reflection, “pure mediation”, relates Wesen and its Schein in the determinate manner: each is determined by its relation to the other, neither is a relation of itself to itself. Ground is “real mediation” because reflection in it is transcended reflection; in its self – relating negativity it has the characteristic of immediacy, and thus Being is “restored” in Essence as Ground.
6. In Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason Hegel sees:
  - (a) the real Being of the things is not its immediate existence but its Ground;
  - (b) this idea, as against the idea of mechanical causality, preserves the notion of teleology – Ground as purpose – and is imminently rational (i.e. as giving reason).
7. Wesen as Grund determines itself (points to itself) as “Nicht gesetztenseyn”. Or, Grund is Wesen posited as the non— posited against positedness. It is a unity of:
  - (a) Ground, “bestimmte Identität” (Wesen = Identität; determined as Ground)
  - (b) The Grounded, the posited as posited, “negative identity” (positedness = Negation).
- 8) Form – “das vollendete Ganze der Reflexion”:
 

“Die Form ist die absolute Negativität selbst, oder die negative absolute Identität mit sich, wodurch eben das Wesen nicht Seyn, sondern Wesen ist.” (p. 559)

“Sie [Form] ist nur das Scheinen desselben in sich selbst, die eigene ihm inwohnende Reflexion.” (p. 559)

Wesen, determinant as Grund, has a particular Form, and so is distinguished from form (other to form) Wesen is Matter (substrate), the “formlosen Unbestimmten”

9. “...das Bestimmtwerden der Materie durch die Form ist die Vermittlung des Wesens als Grund mit sich in einer Einheit, durch sich selbst und durch die Negation seiner selbst.” (p. 565)

“Die Materie ist vielmehr die Identität des Grundes und des Begründeten, als Grundlage, welche dieser Formbeziehung gegenüber steht.” (p. 561)

Form is determined as activity, matter as passivity; each is what the other is not. But it is impossible that matter should be without Form: in fact, its form is precisely, “formless indeterminacy”. Likewise, form without matter is a mere mental abstraction.

“What appears as the activity of Form, is just the movement of matter itself” (p. 563-4). The two are moments of the unity, the in – itself and the posited. When they are seen together,

“Das Resultat ist daher die Einheit des Ansichseyns und des Gesetzseyns. Die Materie ist als solche bestimmt, oder hat nothwendig eine Form, und die Form ist schlechthin materielle, bestehende Form.” (p. 564)

Grund: negative sich auf sich beziehendes Identität (p. 568): as such, Inhalt enthält: negative unity of Ground and Grounded.

“Diese negative Vermittlung des Grundes und des Begründeten ist die eigenthümliche Vermittlung der Form als solcher, die formelle Vermittlung.” (p. 568)

Form, Content: each is itself and also one moment of the other.

Der Grund (2):

Grund – (a) “...in sich reflektirte Inhaltsbestimmung des Daseyns,...”

(b) das Gesetzte (differentiation of form and content).

“Ferner als Grund und Begründetes auf einander bezogen, ist der Grund das in dem Andern als in seinem Gesetzseyn in sich reflektirte; der Inhalt also, welchen die Seite des Grundes hat, ist ebenso im Begründeten; dieses als das Gesetzte hat nur in jenem seine Identität mit sich und sein Bestehen.” (p. 575)

Real Ground – relation

(a) Inhaltsbestimmung as simple identity of Ground and Grounded; form is external to it, and “immediate manifold,” unessential; as opposed to wesentliche Inhalt.

(b) “...Etwas, als die Beziehung des unterschiedenen Inhalts,...”

Summary:

A. Formal Ground – relation: both ground and grounded have one and the same content – therefore a tautology; content is indifferent to form.

B. Real Ground – relation:

(a) no connection between the various Grounds of the determinations of the thing.

(b) no essential way of determine which content of the thing is its true ground – also here, content is indifferent to form.

[p. 581: Platonic idea = “der Sache an und für sich selbst”; der Begriff]

This Ground – Relation is only posited, result of an external reflection; the various determinants are immediately related to one another.

Completed Ground:

Variety to Difference – any particular thing, is by virtue of its being, different from other things, i.e., it has difference in it (variety is purely external)

Opposition – on the basis of the above, we now see that one and the same thing is both like and unlike, identical and various.

Contradiction – since the thing is both identical and various, its moments are contradictory.

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“zu grunde gehen” - “perish”, but going back to its Ground.

II, 61 – “positedness is thus made into positedness”

What was first seen as mere positedness, something there (contingent, Vorgefundenen) is later seen as posited by itself.

In contradiction, the opposing determination of, e.g., positive and negative, are each posited and are transcended in the opposition.

They unite in a negative unity, i.e., this unity is only the activity of reflection (the negation of any pre-given reflection); [all reflections transforms its material].



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The universe is a closed system, and only as such is it rational and understandable. There are no essentially new developments in it – which does not mean that there is no development. The development is cyclical – the concept realizing itself (the return to the beginning). The Telos of the whole, the universe, is the unity of subject and object (for Hegel attainable only in thought): Bei- sich-selbst-bleiben im Anderssein.

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## CLASS HANDOUT

Hegel / Science of Logic  
 February 15, 1967  
 Professor Marcuse

### Notes on “Appearance”

The quotations below are from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Section Two, “The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding”.

The first two are from the first edition – the next two are from the second.

The page numbers are from K. Smith's translation).

(134) “we have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of representation.”

“... (140) Now, since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances, so far as this synthesis is to yield empirical knowledge, the appearances are subject to a priori conditions, with which the synthesis of their apprehension must be in complete accord. The representation of universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion is called a rule, and, when it must be so posited, a law. Thus all appearances stand in thorough going connection according to necessary laws and therefore in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical is a mere consequence.”

“... (147) Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains an recognition, the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of experience, certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience, and there with all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge. These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as the concern solely at the form of and experience in general, are the categories... Only by means of these fundamental concepts can appearances belong to knowledge or even to our consciousness, and so to ourselves.”

From the Second Edition:

“... (162) Our conclusion therefore is this: the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience.”

“... (172) That the laws of appearances in nature must agree with the understanding of its a priori form, that is, with its faculty of combining the manifold in general, is no more surprising than that the appearances themselves must agree with form of a priori sensible intuition. For just as appearances do not exist in themselves but only relatively to the subject in which, so far as it has senses, the inhere, so the laws do not exist in the appearances but only relatively to this same being, so far as it has understanding. Things in themselves would necessarily, apart from any understanding that knows them, conform to laws of their own. But appearances are only representations of things which are known as regards what they may be in themselves. As mere representations, they are subject to no law of connection save that which the connection faculty prescribes. Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility. All possible perception is thus dependent upon synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis in turn upon transcendental synthesis, and therefore upon the categories. Consequently, all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can come to empirical consciousness, that is all appearances of nature, must, so far as the connection is concerned, be subject to the categories.”

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#### Notes on “Appearance”


the following two passages are from the sections of Part Two entitled “Transcendental Dialectic.” These are remarks summarizing the preceding analysis.

“...(303) Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.”

“...(308) Concepts of Understanding are also thought a priori antecedently to experience and for the sake of experience, but they contain nothing more than the unity of reflection upon appearances, insofar as these appearances must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone is knowledge and the determination of an object possible.”

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## Brief Diagram of "Deduction "



“The persistence of the One is the non-persistence of the One”: the persistence of the slave, reinforcing the dependence of the Master, constitutes the denial of the essential nature of Mastery.

This chapter emphasizes the idea of totality, the central emphasis on the relation between (in general) the One and the Other.

The Law of Appearance: each existent thing has its existence only in its negative relationship to an Other; the existent thing as independent things dissolves – this is precisely the truth of the appearance of the world.

The multitude of things as appearance: the independent existence of things dissolves in the relation of each thing to an Other; but the totality which is the negative relation to things is the appearance of the world.

\*\* Appearance is the condition where in each existent thing shows itself as independent of all other things [but this is not the way it really is].

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Appearance – “unity of show and existence” (Sartre, *L’être et le Néant*: unity of playing a role and existence [the waiter]).

What appears first as turbulent change shows itself and essentially orderly process governed by laws – the appearance of reason in the world of appearances.

The law of appearance makes the appearance into mere appearances (secondary as opposed to primary qualities, etc.): The negative unity of laws.

The particular factor is a totality in itself, but beyond that it is a part of the complete totality – the Concept.

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“Essence must appear”. Denial of the contingency of appearances and of any divorce between stable essence divorced from appearances.

Being: understood as “power,” but in a state of negativity, lack, want, striving to overcome this want, – transition to essence. The must is an ontological requirement, not one imposed by the observing subject.

Existence: the essential immediate.

Being Is Essence: one – dimensional immediacy of Being with which the Logic begins, transforms itself into the two – dimensional world of Being and Essence. Essence as mediating force, whose activity necessarily results in existence: but this immediacy of existence is far different from the first (Being), for it is mediated by essence; ex-istence, the “coming out of” something (essential being, ground, foundation).

Appearance:

(1) Existence

(2) Appearance

(3) Essential relation = Actuality

“whatever is, exists”: existence as a result, a process, in which facts are constituted; they are not just what they are, but come about as the result of a some of conditions: each fact has a history. Thus, this can be used as a critique of positivism and the positivistic idea of a “fact”.

Formal Ground: – its defect was to show an Identity of content between ground and grounded, e.g., where an electrical phenomenon is explained by electricity or the attraction between Sun and Earth is explained by an attractive force.

Real Ground: – assimilates certain external characteristics of the Grounded into the Ground; but this leads us to give perhaps too many reasons as a Ground, and everything would then qualify (see p. 91).

[The answer: the correct notion of ground is the concept – in the case of the house, in the mind of the architect – which is the final cause, in that it organizes the totality of all the causes involved in the construction of the house.]

In order to actually function as Ground, Ground must be seen to have certain determinant conditions, i.e., to find that something which conditions the existence of the Grounded.

Conclusion: Be –Ding-ung, i.e., the condition so that which makes this thing, now immaterial as well as a formal sense.

Condition: immediate circumstances for the determinant of Ground. (E.g. What is the ground of the water's boiling? Many immediate conditions – heat, etc.). Thus, Ground presupposes condition, but conditions are comprehensible only with purpose of providing a Ground.

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(p. 100) All the immediate determinants of a thing find their meaning into becoming of the essence of that thing (“ Being is only the Becoming of Essence ”).

\*Ground cannot be separated from that which is Grounded; it inheres in it. Therefore, it is the Form (forming force) of the Grounded.

Form is a determination of Essence in the sense that the negative nature of essence – its negating of all particular determinations – is a forming process.

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One of the main points of Essence: what traditional ontology regards as a static relationship – e.g. Form and matter – is here shown as process, activity: matter “seeks” and form, and form is the shaping activity.

[In German: what English distinguishes as “reason“ and “ground” is the same – Grund; e.g., “zureichende Grund.”

Two sides of one activity: formal matter or persisting form.

Formal matter is Content, and thus form is internal in Content.

[Against the aesthetic theory that the form is the essential element in a work of art, and that any content may be substituted within a form.]

What is the “Ground” of, say, Romeo and Juliet?

[Answer]: Negatively, no one element or factor, but the whole.

Opposition: essential contradiction. Something confronted by – not any other – but by its Other. Positive – Negative.

Both sides are mediated by the other; each is impossible without the other.

Positive and negative only are in relation to one another, therefore each contains its other; yet each are what they are only because they are not the other.

This type of opposition is contradiction.

Resolution of contradiction:

contradiction destroyed independence of opposites.

opposites because determination of a third – the unity of the two.

But this is negative unity.

Transition to Ground:

Essence can only posit itself, if it is posited as ground, as that which resolves contradictory determination.

Ground is that which generates contradiction, but contradictions within the unity of Essence.

Essence “comprehensive itself” as Ground. Perhaps first step to subjectivity – ground is “power” of a thing to remain identical with itself; “holding together,” *com-prehende*.

Ground: that on which the contradiction is founded in that which determines the contradiction.

The Thing: we have now reached a stage of being in which we have existent things which are the cause of their own determinations. Existence is composed only of individual, concrete, particular things. An existing thing which has “grown together” and is thus a master of its own

existence. It is also thing – in – itself, i.e., has a self by which we can distinguish it from other things (we are approaching subjectivity).

\* Sein is **only** Seiendes.

The Thing and its Properties: the thing as the dynamic unity or power of holding together its properties and thus constituting itself. Equivalent to the modern scientific understanding: the thing really is a unity of various mechanical, electrical, etc. processes.

The Etwas is strictly identified with its qualities, the Ding is a unity of the thing – in – itself and its qualities. Negative unity: distinguished with yet united with its qualities. The Ding has its qualities, and can change its qualities and yet remain Ding.

Negative unity: the Ding is not identical with any or all of its qualities, thus it is a unity of what it is not: the unity of contradiction.

Thing – in – itself: essential immediacy

external existence – changing



(distinction within existence)

Constellation of properties of the thing: these are mediated because the thing – in – itself contains them; they are the un-essential because they can change while the thing remains what it is.

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“Ground” does not remain behind but is a part of the Thing.

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
Existence: relation between essence and appearance.

Top p. 112: The Reflexionsbestimmung can now be seen as relations in and of the Thing itself, modes of the Thing’s existence, processes in and of existing Things, and not of formal logical principles.

The Thing in itself is groundless and unconditioned in that it is its own ground. It first appears as the identical in existence, or, in traditional terms what could be called substance, which has existence as a predicate. Thus, we have:

Thing in itself

External



“External” existence

Unessential

p. 114 As that which is other to the in – itself and thus is groundless in relation to that which is grounded in itself, and is grounded in the thing in itself – external existence “cancels itself” and shows itself to be identical with Being- in- self.

Every moment of external existence is thus a movement of the Thing in itself; the Thing in itself is related to other in – themselves in a negative fashion, i.e. In repelling the others and thereby constituting its own unity (sich auf sich, abstossende).

The qualities of the Thing in itself first appeared as the unessential; with the disappearance of the unessential, these take on characteristics of things – in – themselves or the other in general (e.g. redness). All of this, the ending of the paragraph says, is the point of view of external reflection. It must still be deduced.

3. A thing remains what it is in itself while it is related to other things through its external qualities.

Pp. 114-115 In the entire analysis, the relation of Being to Essence manifests itself in the whole and in any particular part of the whole. Therefore, the relation between the Thing – in – itself to its properties is an example of the general relation in the totality.

p.120 Dialectical form: the Thing, formerly the essential, now shown as the unessential with regard to properties. The truth of the Thing is seen in properties; the truth of properties in matters (i.e., whatever science regards as the ultimate constituent of matter).

The analysis of the Thing was the stage of identity. The discussion of matters moves us to the stage of difference (i.e. different independently – subsisting matters which constitute the Thing).

Self – contradiction: the Thing consists of a multitude of independent matters yet it does not constitute one thing. A thing which has its Being – in – Self is unessential in Appearances.

The thing whose existence is based on the contradiction could be only an appearance: but this is also the essential nature of existence (based on self – contradiction).

Being, Sein (infinitive noun): all determination – quality, quantity, measure, etc. – is it determination of a Seiendes, not of Sein. It is the negation of all determinants which can be attributed to a specific Being.

Transition from Being to Essence: The “is” in “man is a rational animal” changes its function; instead of defining the being (Dasein) of man, it defines the essence of man which in turn determines the Dasein.

During the analysis of Essence, Being has to be “restored,” for initially it seems to have been swallowed up in Essence; it becomes concrete in existence, i.e. essential being.



“The oneness that divides itself into itself and its other” – the world as it is in and for itself (the world of laws) and the world of appearance – p. 137.

[Cf. *Phenomenology*, Eng tr. p. 205 – “distorted world,” inverted]

The one is the exact opposite of the other, but in a directly related way: the sun appears to revolve about the Earth, but in reality, vice-versa.

\*Appearance: Two Realms:

(1) realm of physical laws

(2) variety of things

Conclusion of the chapter: the dichotomy (essentially a Kantian one) is a false one, because the two exist only in the essential relation to one another.

(The dichotomy is in the first case the result of consciousness – which makes the distinction between appearances and reality.)

\* [Basic proposition of idealism: primacy of contradiction over being.]

## ESSENTIAL RELATION.

The relation between essence and being is determined further as relations between whole/parts, force/manifestation, inner/outer.

There is no longer two worlds or realms, but only one; the relations are relative within one reality.

Whole and parts: both are essentially related to each other – one is not without the other; but there is an infinite movement back and forth, because one part of the whole can be treated as a whole which itself is composed of parts and vice versa; its movement is force (Kraft).

With force and manifestation, there is transition to inner dimensions – from a mechanical to a dynamic expression of essence (p. 149).

One force “solicits” another - but another force. Forces can be distinguished - e.g., magnetism, electricity – but can be essentially seen as parts of one same energy. Force is the inner, its manifestation the outer; but these are virtually identical.

p. 156ff., if something is determined as merely (only) Inner, in doing so I have determined it externally, i.e. as an Outer; in positing something as merely Outer, I have already posited the Inner.

p. 159, externality is the manifestation of that which is in itself – Hegel’s interpretation of the Aristotelian *Energia*; something is actual and so far as externalizes what it is in itself, as process of self – manifestation. The distinction between essence and existence breaks down, the actual in the realization of the essence in existence (everything else is appearance); the rational is actual, and the actual is rational. Entire existence is through realization of essence – nothing “remains behind.”